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Abstract—We consider a network of Internet of Things devices
transmitting to an IoT Gateway (IoT-GW). Such communications
can potentially be overheard by one or multiple eavesdroppers
whose position is unknown. Our goal is to design an artificial
noise (AN)-aided transmit strategy such that the secrecy capacity
always be positive everywhere across the served region, subject to
power and interference cancellation constraints. We thus propose
a communication design where the potential eavesdroppers are
deactivated by means of jamming operations performed by 1) an
In-Band Full Duplex (IBFD) IoT-GW and/or by 2) cooperative
helpers featuring multiple antennas. We show that the solution
where only the IBFD IoT-GW generates AN is feasible in the
smart-home use case, i.e., when a neutralization zone around
each IoT-device is assumed. In the case with helpers instead,
we show that the Average number of Secure Connections (ASC)
increases at least exponentially with the density of the helpers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is regarded as the next big
revolution in digital communications. Billions of old and
new physical objects (aka Things) - embedded with sensors,
controllers and actuators - will soon become IoT-augmented,
i.e., will be enabled to sense, process and transmit data;
with a tremendous impact on industrial processes, business
services and people ’s everyday life. In this new context,
wireless communications are the key to provide connectivity
to the Things; the latter are by definition extremely limited
in terms of battery/processing power and architecture, so
that the unique opportunities linked to IoT come along with
unique challenges.
In this paper, we address the problem of protecting
IoT delay-tolerant uplink data, consisting of users’ private
information, from eavesdropping. Motivated by the fact
that using traditional cryptographic tools is not practical nor
realistic with IoT networks (seen the extremely limited amount
of resources available at the IoT-devices and IoT-gateways
IoT-GW) we propose the use of PHY layer security achieved
by smart jamming operations. We assume that the position
of the eavesdropper(s) is unknown so that we aim to ensure
the secrecy across a whole region around the IoT-GW. We
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will show how this is made possible by leveraging In-Band
Full-Duplex (IBFD) technology and/or cooperative jamming,
and will present a first methodic study which points out the
practicability of the presented solutions. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study bridging the gap between
information-theoretical tools and practical IoT applications.
PHY layer security is an information-theoretic approach
that allows to achieve secrecy by using channel codes
and signal processing techniques. The seminal work of
Wyner [1] dated 1975 introduced the degraded wiretap
channel and the fundamental notion of secrecy capacity.
Three years later, Wiener’s secrecy capacity formulation
was generalized to non-degraded broadcast channels with
confidential information [2] and Gaussian wiretap channels
[3]; and more recently to MIMO wiretap channels [4]. In
the meantime, the literature on secrecy capacity has been
growing: Many papers can be found on the secrecy rate
maximization problem with one or more eavesdroppers (see
[5], [6] and references therein) and with different assumptions
on transmitter/receiver/eavesdropper antenna configurations
and channel state information (CSI).
A few works focus on the case where there is no Eve’s
CSI (i.e., the position of the eavesdropper is unknown):
In [7] the authors present scaling results on the per-node
secure throughput in a network of transmitter-receiver pairs.
In [8] a stochastic cooperative jamming strategy to thwart
the eavesdropper(s) anywhere in the network is proposed.
Compared to this strategy, the cooperative scheme we propose
in this paper does not cause data rate degradation to the
legacy IoT users and does not require protocol modifications.
In [9] the authors propose a secure transmission design
between a secondary transmitter- receiver pair in the presence
of randomly distributed eavesdroppers under an interference
constraint set by the primary user. In [10] the authors present
a scheme for compensating non-altruistic SUs for providing
jamming service by providing variable spectrum resources.
This can be used in conjunction with stochastic protocols to
optimize CR performance [11], [12].
As for In-Band Full-Duplex (IBFD) technology, this was
firstly thought as a way to enhance spectrum efficiency
2[13]. It was then proposed as a way to provide PHY layer
secrecy by letting legacy nodes receive and at the same time
transmit AN (see, e.g., [14] and references therein). However,
the biggest practical impediments to IBFD operation is the
presence of self-interference, i.e., the interference caused by
an IBFD nodes own transmissions to its desired receptions
[15]. In this paper, we take the self-interference cancellation
constraint into account and provide results accordingly.
With this paper, our contribution is three-fold:
‚ We consider a realistic IoT network and formulate a
power optimization problem by taking into account in-
terference cancellation, secrecy capacity and power con-
straints (Section II).
‚ We provide simple design rules for achieving a positive
secrecy capacity everywhere across the served region,
regardless of Eve’s position, in the cases where:
– the AN is broadcasted by the IoT-GW only (Sec-
tion III).
– the AN is broadcasted by the IoT-GW and by a set
of cooperative jammers featuring multiple antennas
(Section IV).
‚ We analyze the effectiveness of our solutions by means of
an extensive numerical analysis with real NB-IoT settings
(Section V).
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Network Model
Let Bpx, ρq be a disk centered at node position x with radius
ρ. We define our network over a disc Bp0, Rq, where 0 is the
origin and corresponds to the location of the IoT-GW. Let
X t1, .., x, ..#X u and X “ txiuiPX Ă Bp0, Rq denote the set
of IoT devices and of their locations respectively. Similarly,
let E “ t1, .., e, ..#Eu and E “ txeu Ă Bp0, 2Rq be the
set of eavesdroppers and of their locations; and let K and
K “ txkukPK Ă Bp0, 2Rq denote the set of helpers and of
their locations. The IoT devices transmit data to the IoT-GW
which for convenience will be referred to as device 0 located
at x0. The IoT-GW features IBFD technology and is therefore
able to receive and transmit on the same frequency band for
security purposes. All operations occur on the same frequency
band B1 centered at f1 and characterized by background noise
power N1 “ N0B1. The resulting network is sketched in
Fig. 1. Nodes in E , K and X are distributed according
to an independent Poisson Point Process (PPP) [16] with
intensities λE , λK and λX respectively across a disk of radius
R centered at the IoT-GW. The Euclidean distance between
two nodes x and y is denoted by dxy and the channel gain
gxy is assumed to be strictly decreasing on the distance dxy
and not dependent on the considered nodes. Each node has
no idea of the information of surrounding nodes. All nodes
are assumed to be static, and the eavesdroppers are passively
operating independently of each other. That is, there exists no
collusion among eavesdroppers.
Fig. 1. Sketch of the considered IoT network.
B. Secure communications
In order for the data transmission from an IoT device i to
be securely received at a destination node j in the presence of
an eavesdropper e, the signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) ie at the eavesdropper’s place xe should be smaller
than the SINR experienced at the destination node xj , i.e.,
SINRie ă SINRij . In particular, given SINR ij ě γj and
SINRie ă γe , where γe ă γj and γe can be arbitrarily small,
the secrecy capacity [3], [4] of the communication between i
and j at each separate transmission can be determined by:
Cij “ maxt0, log2p1`SINRijq´ log2p1`SINRiequ (1)
That is, i and j can achieve secure communication with
secrecy rate Rij ă Cij by agreeing on a code.
Recalling that the eavesdroppers follow a PPP process E , a
secure data link can be defined as follows [8]:
Definition 1 (Secure Data Link). The data link from xi to xj
is secure if and only if
SINRij ě γj and SINRie ă γe, @e P E . (2)
In our model, the above security conditions are met thanks
to jamming operations which generate neutralization zones.
Definition 2 (Neutralization zone). A neutralization zone is
an area across which conditions (2) are satisfied, i.e., where
no eavesdropper is able to overhear transmissions performed
by any IoT device of the network .
We model the neutralization zones by disks Bpx, ρq,
x Ă Bp0, 2Rq, ρ ą 0. The jamming operation are performed
3by the IBFD IoT-GWs emitting artificial noise (AN) with
power P0 and/or a set of cooperative helpers which are capable
of steering their jamming signal away of the IoT-GW (by
means of multiple antenna techniques such as beamforming).
The IBFD IoT-GW is then able to partially cancel the related
self-interference from its in-band receive antenna. We say
partially because self-interference cancellation is a complex
operation and so far it has only been proven the possibility
to cancel up to 110dB [15].
C. Problem Formulation
We formulate the problem of minimizing the IoT-GW
transmit power while securing the uplink IoT data in the case
of unknown eavesdroppers location. We focus on the case
where all IoT devices transmit with the same power P and
all the helpers transmit with the same power Q and set-up the
following optimization problem:
minimize P0 (3)
s.t. SINRi0 ě γ0 @i P X (4)
SINRie ă γE @i P X ,@e P E (5)
P0 ď Pmax0 (6)
where
SINRi0 “ Pgi0
N1 ` P0h0 , (7)
SINRie “ Pgie
N1 ` P0g0e `řkPKQgke (8)
where h0 denotes the IoT-GW self-interference reduction fac-
tor, Pmax0 denote the maximum power the IoT-GW can use for
jamming operations. Note that γE “ minetγeu, meaning that
no eavesdropper is able to decode messages if the experienced
SINR is less than γE .
III. JAMMING FROM THE IOT-GW ONLY
Let us firstly focus on the case where there are no coopera-
tive jamming nodes. This is equivalent to setting Q “ 0 in (8).
In this scenario a worst case communication can be defined
as follows:
Definition 3 (Worst case communication). The worst case
communication is the one occurring from the farthest IoT-
device (from the IoT-GW) when an eavesdropper e˚ is co-
located with it.
The following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 1. An IoT network is fully secure (i.e., all of its
data links are secure) if all IoT-devices transmit at a secrecy
rate which is less than the secrecy capacity calculated wrt to
the worst case communication.
From the Proposition, a solution to the optimization problem
(3)-(6) exists if the IoT-GW can guarantee secure data links to
all of its associated IoT-devices. This is possible by generating
a neutralization zone covering the whole IoT network.
Theorem 1. Assume gxy “ fpdxyq is a monotone function
(strictly decreasing in Euclidean distance dxy and not depen-
dent on the position of x and y). Further, assume i˚ is the
farthest IoT-device from the IoT-GW and e˚ is its co-located
eavesdropper. Then:
1) The IoT-GW can guarantee a positive secrecy rate to all
its associated IoT-devices if
h0 ă γEgi˚0pPgi˚0 ´N1γ0q
γ0pP ´N1γEq (9)
2) When such inequality holds, there exists a solution to the
optimization problem (3)-(6). Such solution is
P0 “ P ´N1γE
gi˚0γE
`  (10)
where  is the smallest power increasing step.
Proof. See Appendix.
However, as shown in the numerical section (Section V)
fully secure communications even in small areas come at
the cost of extremely high IoT-GW AN transmit power. This
reduces drastically the business potential of the proposed
technique (for instance, it would be unrealistic to install such
power-hungry IoT-GW at the users’ premises) and motivates
us to seek other ways to improve the IoT network secrecy
capacity while reducing the IoT-GW power consumption.
Thus, we now study the cases with protected surroundings
and with helpers.
A. Protected surroundings
In some scenarios, each legitimate IoT-node may be able
to physically inspect its surroundings and deactivate the
eavesdroppers falling inside some neutralization region. With
each node, we associate a neutralization region inside which
all eavesdroppers have been deactivated. This can be the case
for indoor IoT nodes (e.g., within the smart home walls).
For finite neutralization regions, we need to define a new
worst case communication case:
Definition 4 (Worst case communication with neutralization
areas). In the presence of finite neutralization areas around
each IoT-device the worst case communication occurs when
an eavesdropper e˚ is located just outside the neutralization
region, on the farthest point from the IoT-GW.
Theorem 2. Consider a neutralization region around each
IoT-node of minimum radius dxixe˚ ´ , where  is a very
small constant. Assume gxy “ fpdxyq is a monotone function
(strictly decreasing in Euclidean distance dxy and not depen-
dent on the position of x and y). Let i˚ be the farthest IoT-
device from the IoT-GW and e˚ be the eavesdropper located
on the farthest point from the IoT-GW which is just outside
the neutralization region. Then,
1) the IoT-GW can guarantee a positive secrecy rate to all
its associated IoT-devices if
h0 ă γEg0e˚pPgi˚0 ´N1γ0q
γ0pPgi˚e˚ ´N1γEq (11)
42) When such inequality holds, there exists a solution to the
optimization problem (3)-(6). Such solution is
P0 “ Pgi˚e˚ ´N1γE
gi˚0γE
`  (12)
where  is the smallest power increasing step.
We will show in the simulation section how even a neu-
tralization region of limited size allows to greatly reduce the
IoT-GW power consumption.
IV. COOPERATIVE APPROACHES
A simple and yet powerful strategy for lowering the IoT-
GW transmit power while guaranteed a certain degree of
secrecy is cooperative jamming [17]. In cooperative jamming,
the IoT-GW artificial noise is complemented by the jamming
signal(s) emitted by a set of of friendly jammers or helpers. We
propose in the following subsections two cooperative jamming
strategies and provide a systematic study of their performance.
A. Based on the location of eavesdroppers
In this section we consider a cooperative model where
the IoT network is populated by helpers which are able to
neutralize potential eavesdroppers located within a certain
radius. The resulting IoT network is sketched in Fig. 2, where
the white areas are the neutralization zones generated by the
helpers.
Note that the considered model with neutralization regions
is general enough to include different sorts of physical
realizations. For example, the helpers can be radio transceivers
able to sense even passive eavesdroppers from their leaked
local oscillator power as described in [18] then, using
directional antennas they can send a jamming signal towards
these eavesdroppers. Using the same model, the neutralization
regions can be viewed as trusted areas where no eavesdropper
can be found, for example this could be locations where
physical security measures dissuades the eavesdroppers.
In the following, we will rate the level of confidentiality of
an IoT network by its Average number of Secure Connections
(ASC) to the IoT-GW. However, due to the fact that a
practical IoT network is envisioned to comprise thousands of
IoT devices, running a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the
ASC can be very daunting and could take days. Therefore,
we aim to obtain a closed-form expression of the ASC lower
bound as this can indeed provide a powerful tool to analyze
IoT networks within shorter terms and limited resources.
Let us recall that helpers, eavesdroppers and IoT devices
are PPP distributed with intensities λK , λE and λX . And let
us adapt a few definitions from graph theory and from [19] to
our case:
Definition 5 (Poisson iS-Graph for IoT networks). The
Poisson intrinsically Secure graph (iS ´ graph) for IoT
networks1 is the directed graph G “ tX Y tx0u , T u with
1The iS-graph was defined in [19] in a setting where every node in the
network could potentially want to talk to any other node.
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Fig. 2. Neutralization region in IoT networks. Note that the eavesdroppers
and the helpers can be in an area much larger than the IoT network itself.
vertex set X Y tx0u and edge set
T “ tÝÝÑxix0 : Ci0 ą 0u . (13)
Definition 6 (IoT-GW in-degree Nin). In the Poisson iS-
Graph for IoT networks, the IoT-GW in-degree Nin is the
number of edges entering the IoT-GW vertex. In other words,
it is the average number of secure connections in the IoT
network.
Definition 7 (IoT-GW In-isolation). In the Poisson iS-Graph
for IoT networks, the IoT-GW In-isolation is the probability
that the IoT-GW cannot receive from anyone with positive
secrecy rate.
By the definitions above, we want the IoT-GW to be the
least In-isolated possible by letting each helper generate a
neutralization zone of finite size.
We approximate the neutralization zones as in [19] by
associating to each helper ki a neutralization zone Θi inside
of which all eavesdroppers will be neutralized. Thus the total
neutralization region Θ is given as
Θ «
#Kď
i“1
pki `Θiq (14)
Where #K is the number of element in K.
The area around the IoT-GW is most sensitive because, the
closer an eavesdropper is to the IoT-GW the higher the
probability of In-isolation. Therefore, we assume that the IoT-
GW is protected inside a neutralisation region of radius ρIoT .
With this model, no protection for the IoT-GW is equivalent
to ρIoT “ 0.
Considering generic path losses gxy , we provide a full
characterization of the proposed cooperative model with the
following theorem.
5Theorem 3. The average number of secure communication
connections in the Poisson iS-Graph for IoT networks is lower
bounded by
EtNinu ě λx
λe
`
piλeρ¯
2
IoT`
1
pΘ¯
“
expp´λepipΘ¯ρ¯2IoT q ´ expp´λepipΘ¯R2q
‰˙
(15)
With pΘ¯ “ e´λkpiρ2k and ρ¯IoT “ ρIoT2
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows how the network parameters are linked
to the number of secure connections. Compared to the result
shown in [19] our result takes into account the physical size
of the network, the presence of helpers, as well as generic
channel gains.
B. Blind Jamming Strategies
We now turn our attention to the case where jamming
operations are performed by the IoT-GW in cooperation
with a set of helpers in the form of multi-antenna friendly
jammers. This could model a 5G LTE small cell network
(5G) where each small cell base station additionally operates
as an IoT-GW and each served multi-antenna LTE terminal
additionally operates as an IoT helper by steering the jamming
beam away of the IoT-GW.
In a first approach, we can assume that each eavesdropper
is jammed only by the closest helper node to its location.
This approximation is even more realistic in the case where
the IoT-devices use the technique Divide-and-Conquer [8]
for their data transmission, provided that the messages are
encoded across a sufficiently large number of blocks and the
helpers are sending jamming signals sporadically.
A second approach is to assume that all the eavesdroppers
are receiving a jamming signal from all the helpers at the
same time. In this scenario also, we consider that the helpers
are able to steer their interference away from the IoT-GW.
The performance of the two approaches above will be shown
and compared in the numerical section (Section V). A more
detailed analysis of this work will be presented in a future
publication.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
For the simulation we consider a NB-IoT network whose
IoT devices transmit with constant power P “ 0dBm across
a bandwidth B1 which is 200kHz wide and is centered
at 900MHz. We calculate the channel gains according to
gxypdq “ A logpdq ` B ` C logpfcq with A “ 22, B “ 28,
C “ 20 (typical urban LOS [20]) and we set in all simulations
γ0 “ 6 and γE “ 3.
In this real world scenario, we want to analyze the results
presented in the form of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. In
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we show the minimum required IoT-GW
performance (in terms respectively of dB to be canceled from
the self-interference signal and artificial noise transmit power)
needed in order to fully secure a disk area of radius R around
the IoT-GW. From the figures it is easy to notice that the case
with co-located eavesdropper is very unrealistic in practice
as a state-of-the-art self-interference cancellation mechanism
and 50 dBm of AN transmit power are required to fully
secure a disk area of only 20m radius. On the other hand, by
considering even a small neutralization region it is possible
to secure much wider areas with much less resources. For
instance a 70m radius area can be fully secured by means
of a 70 dB self-interference cancellation mechanism and 36
dBm AN transmit power for the 1m protected surroundings
case.
In Fig. 5 we show the secrecy capacity lower bound for
IoT communications within a network of radius R. We say
lower bound because that will be the maximum secrecy rate
that can be achieved by an IoT-device in the worst case
communication scenario (with and without neutralization
areas). Note that this holds true because all the IoT devices
transmit with the same power.
Fig. 6 shows the ASC from the IoT devices to the IoT-GW
in percentage of the total number of IoT-devices against
the size of the neutralization regions generated by the
helpers. The neutralization region of the IoT-GW is fixed
at ρIoT “ 0m and the network size is R “ 100m. The
Monte carlo simulation and theoretical curves are shown for
λx “ 0.1, which corresponds to an average number of 3141
IoT devices. We see that the simulation curves and the lower
bounds are very close.
In Fig. 7 we show the ASC when the eavesdroppers
are jammed by the closest helper only. Three different
cases are shown, first, when the IoT-GW is not sending
jamming signal in the network we see that with helpers
power of -5dBm only 40% of the IoT devices are secured
in average. This number grows to almost 60% when the
IoT-GW sends a 0dBm jamming signal and 90% when the
IoT-GW jamming signal power is 15dBm. However, even
without IoT-GW jamming, the helpers are able to secure 90%
of the IoT-devices with a power of just 5dBm whereas the
IoT-GW would need at least 15dBm to obtain the same results.
In Fig. 8 we compare the scenario where an eavesdropper is
jammed by its closest helper to the one where the eavesdropper
is jammed by all the helpers. The first obvious result is that
the performance is higher when all the helpers are considered
at the same time. However, the gap between the two scenario
is smaller if the helpers are transmitting at higher power, and
the aggregate interference created by the network to potential
neighboring networks is much less if only one helper is
jamming at one time.
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Fig. 3. Minimum self-interference cancellation (SIC) performance required at
the IoT-GW in order to achieve fully secure NB-IoT communications across
a disk-shaped area of radius R around the IoT-GW.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have studied the confidentiality of the
communications flowing from a network of IoT devices
to a reference IoT-GW when the position of the potential
eavesdropper(s) is unknown. By building on the concepts of
jamming by artificial noise (AN) and In band full duplex we
have proposed smart jamming strategies aimed at minimizing
the IoT-GW AN power consumption while guaranteeing a
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7positive secrecy rate across the IoT-GW served region. To
study the proposed jamming strategies, we have used the
concept of neutralization regions, which are areas within the
IoT network where all eavesdroppers are deactivated (i.e., they
are not able to decode information). We have shown that
the solution where only the IBFD IoT-GW generates AN is
viable in the smart-home use case, i.e., when a neutralization
zone around each IoT-device is assumed. In the case with
helpers and punctual jamming instead, we have shown that
the Average number of Secure Connections (ASC) increases
at least exponentially with the density of the helpers.
In our parallel ongoing work, we are studying AN-based smart
jamming strategies for downlink IoT communications, for the
backhaul (i.e., from the IoT-GW to an IoT cloud receiver), and
for delay-sensitive applications.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that the secrecy rate capacity of IoT-device i wrt
eavesdropper e is Ci0 “ maxt0, log2p1`SINRi0q´log2p1`
SINRiequ, where
SINRi0 “ Pgi0
N1 ` P0h0
Assuming reciprocal channel gains (i.e., e.g., gi0 “ g0i) and
for the worst case where an eavesdropper e˚ is co-located
with a transmitting IoT-device i (i.e., gi0 “ ge˚0 “ g0e˚ ),
SINRie˚ can be written as follows:
SINRie˚ “ P
N1 ` P0gi0
According to constraints (4) and constraints (5) (which reflect
conditions (2)) an IoT-device experiences positive secrecy rate
if SINRi0 ě γ0 and SINRie˚ ă γE , i.e.,#
Pgi0
N1`P0h0 ě γ0
P
N1`P0gi0 ă γE
It is easy to verify that the system of inequalities above is
solved for P´N1γEgi0γE ă P0 ď Pgi0´N1γ0h0γ0 .
Thus a finite P0 exists only if Pgi0´N1γ0h0γ0 is strictly greater
than P´N1γEgi0γE , which holds for h0 ă γEgi0pPgi0´N1γ0qγ0pP´N1γEq (point
1 of the Theorem). From this one can easily infer that 1) if
g(.) is strictly decreasing as a function of the distance dxy
between positions x and y, the most stringent condition for
h is wrt the farthest IoT-device i˚ from the IoT-GW. Thus,
if the inequality holds for such worst case, then it holds for
all the IoT devices of the network (point 1 of the Theorem)
2) The minimum feasible P0 is P´N1γEgi0γE ` , where  is
the smallest possible power increasing step (point 2 of the
Theorem).
Proof of Theorem 3
In order for a device (say x) to be able to establish a secure
communication link to the IoT-GW there must not be any
eavesdropper within a disc of radius dxo around the device.
If there is an eavesdropper within Bpx, dxoq then to keep the
link secure that eavesdropper must be neutralized by a helper
or by the IoT-GW.
8Hence, the set of users able to achieve a secure communication
link to the IoT-GW is given as
S “
!
x ; x P X and ˝B px, dxoq X Θ¯XK “ H
)
(16)
Where
˝
B px, dxoq “ Bpx, dxoq{Bp0, ρIoT q is the disc centered
on x of radius dxo without the zone neutralized by the IoT-
GW.
We can write the number of secure links from the IoT
devices to the IoT-GW as
Nin “
ÿ
xPX
1 tx P Su
“
x
Bp0,Rq
1 tx P SuX pdxq
Therefore
E tNinu “ λx
x
Bp0,Rq
Px tx P Su dx (17)
“ λx
¨˝
piρ¯2IoT `
x
Dpρ¯IoT ,Rq
Px tx P Su dx‚˛ (18)
Where Dpρ¯IoT , Rq is the annulus centered at the origin with
inner radius ρ¯IoT and outer radius R with 0 ď ρ¯IoT ď R .
Now let’s find the palm probability Px tx P Su
Px tx P Su “ PΘ,K
! ˝
B px, dxoq X Θ¯XK “ H
)
(19)
“ EΘ
!
expp´λeAp ˝B px, dxoq X Θ¯q
)
(20)
ě exp
´
´λeEΘ
!
Ap ˝B px, dxoq X Θ¯q
)¯
(21)
Where (21) is obtained using Jensen’s inequality, EX is the
average according to the random variable X, Apq gives the
area of a specified random region.
EΘ
!
Ap ˝B px, dxoq X Θ¯q
)
“
x
˝
Bpx,dxoq
P
 
y P Θ¯( dy (22)
ď
x
Bpx,dxoq
P
 
y P Θ¯( dy (23)
“ pid2xo e´λkpiρ
2
klooomooon
fipΘ¯
(24)
Therefore
Px tx P Su ě expp´λepipΘ¯d2xoq (25)
And finally we can obtain equation (15) by plugging this last
result back into equation (18).
